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I. INTRODUCTION
SINCE Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the law has recognized thatthe government need not physically occupy property or exercise itspower of eminent domain to take private property under the Fifth
Amendment, instead recognizing that the government takes property if it
“goes too far.”1 In Katzin v. United States, the plaintiffs argued that the
government could go “too far” with its non-regulatory action, thus consti-
tuting a “non-possessory physical taking.”2 The Federal Circuit rejected
this argument, holding that the Government did not take private property
by misrepresenting to a purchaser of real estate that the seller did not
own the property even though this representation rendered the property
unsalable.3 The Federal Circuit’s holding is incorrect because it misinter-
prets Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, fails to consider the
purpose of the Takings Clause, and is counter to the underlying reasoning
in Pennsylvania Coal.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Dr. and Ms. Katzin owned a 50% interest in an oceanfront
parcel on the island of Culebra.4 The remaining 50% interest was owned
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, Class of 2021; B.A. in Public Policy
and Political Science from SMU Dedman College of Humanities and Sciences, Class of
2018. Special thanks to my wife, Kelsey Kemp, for her love and patience.
1. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
2. Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1353–54.
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by plaintiff Winters.5 In 1903, the plaintiffs’ predecessor in interest signed
a deed of sale which transferred a 2.25 acre tract to the U.S. Navy for use
as a gun mount.6 The parties also entered a contemporaneous “Agree-
ment of Sale.”7 While the deed describes the gun mount site as being
outside of the parcel which the plaintiffs owned, the Agreement of Sale
placed the gun mount site somewhere within the plaintiffs’ parcel.8 Fur-
ther complicating matters, some historical surveys of the plaintiffs’ land
included a 10.01 acre peninsula near the purported site of the gun mount
within the parcel, while others omitted the peninsula entirely.9
In 2006, the plaintiffs entered into a contract to sell their parcel for $4
million.10 While the property was under contract, the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service (as successors in interest to the U.S. Navy) sent a fax to the
purchaser asserting government ownership over the 2.25 acre gun mount
site and the 10.01 acre peninsula.11 As a result, the purchaser refused to
close, and the plaintiffs have since been unable to sell the property.12
The Katzins brought a takings claim against the Government in the
Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act.13 After a nine day
trial on the merits, the Court of Federal Claims held that (1) the plaintiffs
were the true owners of the entire parcel, including the peninsula where
the gun mount site was located;14 and (2) the Government effected a non-
possessory physical taking when it claimed ownership of the parcel, de-
priving the plaintiffs of their right to dispose of the property.15 After the
Government’s appeal, a divided panel on the Federal Circuit reversed the
Court of Federal Claims and rendered judgment for the Government.16
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S OPINION
The Federal Circuit analyzed the case as only presenting a taking if the
Government’s action fit into one of three buckets: (1) physical, (2) regu-
latory, or (3) per se regulatory takings; ultimately, it concluded that the
Government’s action did not amount to a taking because it could not fit
the facts into one of the buckets.17 Though the facts of the case could
have been analyzed as a taking under Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, the court declined to do so because of a deficiency in
the plaintiffs’ pleadings; it instead considered only whether the case was a




9. Katzin v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 440, 451–56 (2016).
10. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1356.
11. Id. at 1357.
12. Id.
13. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2020).
14. Katzin, 127 Fed. Cl. at 478–79.
15. Id. at 482.
16. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1363.
17. Id. at 1361.
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physical or per se regulatory taking.18 The opinion’s formalistic insistence
on categorization created uncertainty in the law for cases where property
owners are deprived of sticks in their bundle of rights but cannot easily fit
into a category.
The majority first analyzed the Government’s action through the prism
of per se regulatory takings.19 As such, the majority analyzed the facts of
the case and determined that neither a Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council nor a Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. per se
regulatory taking occurred because the plaintiffs were not totally de-
prived of the property’s use and did not suffer a permanent physical inva-
sion.20 The court then analyzed the plaintiffs’ physical takings claim,
citing only two physical takings cases.21 One of the cases, Washoe County
v. United States, was a water rights case arising out of the denial of gov-
ernment access to build a pipeline and bore no factual similarity to Kat-
zin.22 As such, it warrants no analysis in this article (or apparently in the
court’s opinion).23
The only factually analogous case cited by the court, Yuba Goldfields,
Inc. v. United States, was reinterpreted as a regulatory takings case.24 The
majority’s analysis of Yuba Goldfields is crucial since the Court of Fed-
eral Claims relied heavily on the case and the case is factually similar to
Katzin.25 In that case, the Government sent a letter to a mining company
claiming the company had no rights to the minerals it was mining.26 That
same letter claimed that the Government held title to the mineral inter-
ests, forbade the company from extracting the minerals, and threatened
enforcement if the company continued mining.27 The Katzin court first
distinguished Yuba Goldfields by pointing out that the Yuba Goldfields
court relied on Penn Central to reach the result, making it a regulatory
takings case.28 Second, the majority noted that the letter in Yuba Gold-
18. Id.; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Since the court did not analyze the Government’s action as a Penn Central regulatory tak-
ing, this article will not consider if a taking occurred under that framework.
19. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1360–63. Although plaintiffs pled a per se regulatory taking,
that was not the basis of the Court of Federal Claims’s decision, and the trial court opinion
devoted no analysis to that claim. Katzin, 127 Fed. Cl. at 479–80.
20. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1362; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435, 437
(1982).
21. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1361–62 (citing Washoe County v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); see also Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15
(1984).
22. See Washoe County, 319 F.3d at 1322–23.
23. See Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1361.
24. See id. at 1362–63 (discussing generally Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723
F.2d 884 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
25. See id.
26. Yuba Goldfields, 723 F.2d at 885.
27. Id. at 885–86.
28. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1363. However, a close reading of Yuba Goldfields reveals that
the court only cited Penn Central for the proposition that physical restraint is unnecessary
for a taking and nowhere in its opinion applied the Penn Central factors. Yuba Goldfields,
723 F.2d at 887–88.
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fields contained threats of coercion, while the fax in Katzin contained no
such threats.29 Instead, the fax “[a]t most . . . disseminated information
about the government’s claims, and the market incorporated that infor-
mation into its valuation of the property.”30
The court then applied Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States
(the second physical takings case) and Dimare Fresh, Inc. v. United States
(a regulatory case) for the rule that government sharing of information
which lowers the property value is not a taking, absent a deprivation of
the legal right of disposition.31 Because the court construed the fax as
mere sharing of information which the market incorporated, the court
found no physical taking.32
Judge Newman dissented because she would have found a taking under
the facts of the case (whether a regulatory or physical taking is unclear).33
As an initial matter, her dissent noted that the relevant inquiry in a tak-
ings case is “whether the governmental action at issue constituted a tak-
ing of [a] ‘stick’ [in the bundle of property rights].”34 Newman identified
the primary “stick” at risk in Katzin as the right of disposition.35 She then
argued the degree of interference with that stick is substantial because
the Government action removed “all economic value from the prop-
erty.”36 Her dissent also indicated that the uncontroverted evidence
demonstrated that the plaintiffs were unable to dispose of their property
because the Government clouded the plaintiffs’ title.37
Having thus identified the “stick” at issue and described the degree of
interference with that stick, Newman relied on Kirby Forest, in which the
Supreme Court stated in dicta that “a radical curtailment of a land-
owner’s freedom to make use of or ability to derive income from his land
may give rise to a taking . . . even if the Government has not physically
intruded upon the premises . . . .”38 Newman’s dissent also noted that the
Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of “whether abrogation
of an owner’s right to sell real property, combined with a sufficiently sub-
29. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1363.
30. Id. at 1362.
31. See id. (citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984);
Dimare Fresh, Inc. v. United States, 808 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
32. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1363.
33. Id. at 1364, 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting). Much of Judge Newman’s analysis fo-
cuses on the majority’s refusal to consider the question of title to the disputed parcel. The
question of whether a court can decide if property has been taken without first determining
title to the property is beyond the scope of this article. However, Newman’s position that
title must be determined as a predicate to a takings analysis finds support in case law. See
Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]s a
threshold matter, the court must determine whether the claimant has established a prop-
erty interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”).
34. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1364 (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
35. Id. at 1367.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1368 (quoting Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14
(1984)).
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stantial diminution of its utility to the owner, would give rise to a taking,”
but recognized that interference with the right of disposal can give rise to
a taking.39 Newman then leapt to the conclusion that the Government
had taken the property because it totally deprived the plaintiffs of the
ability to sell the property and substantially impaired the property’s
value.40
Though Newman reached a more palatable conclusion, the way she
came to that conclusion is unsatisfying. Her opinion cited dicta in Kirby
Forest, which left open the question before the court, but does not ex-
plain why the particular facts in Katzin should amount to a taking.41 To
do so, she would need to explain why the Government’s action was a
burden “which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole.”42
IV. THE COURT’S PITFALLS AND HOW TO AVOID THEM
In Katzin, the court made three major errors in its legal analysis. First,
in its effort to untangle the Gordian knot of modern takings jurispru-
dence,43 it misinterpreted relevant precedent—adding another dangerous
kink to the mess. Second, the court never once considered whether its
conclusion was consistent with the purpose of the Takings Clause. Third,
the court ignored the underlying rationale of Pennsylvania Coal, that the
government can take property without physically possessing it.44 In the
future, as other circuits address nonpossessory physical takings, they can
avoid the pitfalls of Katzin by clearly identifying the property right at
issue, determining the impact of the government’s actions on that right,
and considering whether that burden should in fairness be borne by the
owner alone or by the community as a whole. This approach cuts to the
heart of the issue without relying on formalistic categories of takings.
The first major error made by the majority was to interpret Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and
Kirby Forest too broadly.45 The majority interpreted Tahoe-Sierra to im-
pose a “bright line” between regulatory and physical takings46 and that
“precedent from one form of taking cannot support the other.”47 How-
ever, Tahoe-Sierra stands only for the narrower principal that cases from
39. Id. (quoting Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 15 & n.25).
40. Id. at 1369.
41. See id. at 1368–69.
42. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
43. For a good summary of takings jurisprudence, see generally D.O. Malagrinò,
Among Justice John Paul Stevens’s Landmark Legacies: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 77 (2019).
44. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922).
45. See Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1361, 1362 (majority opinion) (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323–24 (2002); Kirby Forest
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 15 (1984)).
46. Id. at 1361.
47. Id. at 1363 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323).
366 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
other categories are not “controlling precedents.”48 If a physical takings
case is factually analogous to a regulatory takings case, Tahoe-Sierra does
not bar the court from examining the case and deciding whether the rea-
soning is convincing.49
The majority’s misreading of Tahoe-Sierra forced it to ignore the factu-
ally analogous Yuba Goldfields case. The Yuba Goldfields court, like the
Katzin court, was faced with a fact pattern that does not easily fit into
either the physical or regulatory categories.50 Instead of heavily relying
on categorization, it viewed the Government’s action as a “[n]on-posses-
sional [t]aking” and inquired as to the degree the Government’s action
deprived the mining company of its property rights.51 However, because
the Katzin majority read Tahoe-Sierra to create a bright line between the
two categories, the majority reinterpreted Yuba Goldfields as a regula-
tory takings case.52
The majority also misapplied Kirby Forest because it failed to recog-
nize that case’s meaningful factual distinctions and refused to consider
whether the facts of Katzin fit into the exception created by the Supreme
Court.53 At issue in Kirby Forest was whether a taking occurred in a
straight-condemnation proceeding when a notice of lis pendens was filed
or on the date of judicial condemnation.54 As the Supreme Court ex-
plained, the notice of lis pendens only had the effect of “notifying the
public of the institution of the condemnation proceeding.”55 But the fax
at issue in Katzin was a bare assertion of title.56 With the notice of lis
pendens, there is an identifiable future event which will vest title in the
government, while the fax in Katzin constituted an immediate claim of
right to the property. Further, as the dissent points out, Kirby Forest spe-
cifically declined to extend its holding to a situation where the owner is
unable to sell her land and the value thereof is substantially diminished.57
The majority committed its second major error by ignoring the purpose
of the Takings Clause. In Armstrong v. United States, Justice Black de-
scribes the purpose of the clause: “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just com-
pensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
48. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (emphasis added).
49. This should particularly be the case with nonpossessory physical takings because,
like most regulatory takings, the government does not actually occupy the property.
50. See Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 885–86 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 887–88.
52. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1363.
53. See id. at 1362.
54. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9 (1984).
55. Id. at 7; see also Lis Pendens, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A no-
tice, recorded in the chain of title to real property, required or permitted in some jurisdic-
tions to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation, and that
any interests acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to its outcome.”).
56. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1364–65 (Newman, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1368 (citing Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 15 n.25).
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borne by the public as a whole.”58 This purpose should not vary between
regulatory and physical takings. The majority failed to consider if the bur-
den of the Government’s claim to the plaintiffs’ land should be borne by
the public or by the plaintiffs alone.
In Katzin, the burden can be articulated as follows: the Government
formed a mistaken belief that it held title to certain lands on the island of
Culebra;59 this mistaken belief was formed based on its own negligent
record-keeping;60 and this mistaken belief was communicated to the pub-
lic by a government official who did not properly verify the Govern-
ment’s claim.61 In Katzin, the court implicitly found it just and efficient
for the plaintiffs to bear this burden.62 But placing the burden on the
public is fair and socially efficient. Charging the public for the govern-
ment’s maladministration and negligence incentivizes the public to enact
reforms and demand higher standards of public officials. On the other
hand, forcing the plaintiffs to bear the burden offers no hope of remedy
for future conduct.
But to determine whether “in all fairness and justice” the public or the
individual should bear the burden requires more than an examination of
efficient administration.63 Fundamentally, such an analysis must obligate
the courts to consider the equities of the case before it. Here, the inequity
of the Government’s victory is unconscionable. At best, the Government
made negligent misrepresentations and tortiously interfered with a con-
tract; at worst, the Government committed fraud and forgery.64 The
plaintiffs suffered ruinous injury, and that injury was a direct and proxi-
mate result of the Government’s infringement on their property rights.
While the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the government from de-
priving individuals of their private property, it does place “a condition on
the exercise of that power.”65 That condition is the payment of “just com-
pensation.”66 The Federal Circuit allowed the Government to rob the
plaintiffs of their right of disposition, cloud their title, and devastate the
value of their property without the payment of “just compensation” be-
58. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
59. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1357 (majority opinion).
60. Katzin v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 440, 451–56 (2016).
61. Katzin, 908 F.3d at 1365 (Newman, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the official
who sent the fax could not find paperwork transferring title to the Fish and Wildlife
Service).
62. See id. at 1357 (majority opinion).
63. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
64. Though the appellate decision declines to go into detail as to how the Government
acquired title to the gun mount site, the Court of Federal Claims found that the grantors of
the gun mount site were a blind woman and an illiterate man who spoke no English. Kat-
zin, 127 Fed. Cl. at 449. The trial court also found no evidence that a translator explained
the contents of the Agreement of Sale to the grantor. Id. at 450. Although the grantor’s
signature appeared on the deed, the court found insufficient evidence that the grantor
actually signed the Agreement of Sale placing the gun mount site inside the parcel at issue
in the case, raising the specter of forgery. Id. at 479.
65. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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cause the majority insisted on formalistic takings categories which were
ill-suited for analyzing the facts of Katzin.
The majority’s third major error was its dogmatic reliance on categori-
zation that ignored the fundamental rationale of Pennsylvania Coal. That
landmark decision marked the genesis of regulatory takings cases by re-
fusing to focus on the mechanism of the taking and instead focusing on
the effect of the government action.67 It was by focusing on the effect of
government action that the Court found that regulation could go “too
far.”68 The effect of the Government’s action in Katzin was to vastly re-
duce the value of the property, place a cloud on the plaintiffs’ title, and
abrogate the plaintiffs’ right to sell the property.69 Focusing on if the tak-
ing was physical or per se regulatory prevented the court from reaching
results consistent with the Takings Clause’s purpose, especially where the
government action fell in between physical occupation and regulation.
For future litigants, Katzin injects uncertainty into this area of takings
law. Though the opinion purports to uphold Yuba Goldfields, it radically
reinterprets the case. The court interprets Yuba Goldfields as a regulatory
takings case, but that case did not consider any of the Penn Central fac-
tors.70 This makes it an open question whether the case is a traditional
regulatory takings case or if the Federal Circuit now recognizes a third
category of per se regulatory takings on the facts of Yuba Goldfields.
Further, the court’s dogmatic insistence on categorization forces liti-
gants to fight over characterization of government action, rather than the
impact of that action. As the law stands, litigants are out of luck if they
have fact patterns that do not easily fit into either category of takings
because the government can cite to Katzin that government actions are
never takings if they do not fit into narrow categories.71
Courts can cleave the Gordian knot. The first step to solving the non-
possessory physical taking problem is clearly identifying the property
right at issue. Clarifying the stick in the bundle of property rights is neces-
sary to assess the importance and scope of the right in question. Second,
courts should determine the impact of the government’s actions on that
right. As Pennsylvania Coal states, government action is a taking when it
goes “too far.”72 Whether government action goes “too far” is dependent
on the impact of the action rather than if the action is regulatory or physi-
cal in character. Finally, courts should inquire whether that burden
should, in fairness, be borne by the owner alone or by the community as a
whole. This step requires analysis of both the efficiencies and equities of
67. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922).
68. Id. at 415.
69. Katzin v. United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
70. See id. at 1361 n.3 (majority opinion); Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723
F.2d 884, 887–88 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
71. See Mangal v. City of Pascagoula, No. 1:19CV232-LG-RHW, 2019 WL 3413850, at
*3–5 (S.D. Miss. July 29, 2019).
72. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414–15.
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allocating the burden. This approach cuts to the heart of the issue without
relying on formalistic categories of takings.
The Federal Circuit’s formalistic reliance on hermetically sealed cate-
gories of takings leads to an unjust result for the Katzins and Ms. Winters.
By refusing to acknowledge that courts must consider fact patterns which
are not so easily categorized, the Federal Circuit dooms property owners
like the Katzins and Ms. Winters to live in limbo.73 Considered through
the lens of the purpose of the Takings Clause and prior case law, this
cannot be the correct result.
73. The plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari indicates that the Government continues to
claim ownership of the parcel, blocking its sale, even though the Court of Federal Claims
found the Government’s claims invalid and the Federal Circuit did not review the findings
of fact. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Katzin, 908 F.3d 1350 (No. 19-258) (U.S.
petition for cert. filed Aug. 23, 2019).
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